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APPELLATE ADVOCACY AS ADULT EDUCATION
Christine Durham*
Since my early days as a trial judge, I have thought of
judges as perpetual "students." Our jobs require us to learn
enough about every case to respond intelligently, perhaps even
wisely, but at least competently to its demands. Those demands,
of course, have become increasingly more complex. Nearly
thirty years ago, then-Judge Shirley Hufstedler commented, in
an address to the New York County Bar Association:
We expect courts to encompass every reach of the law,
and we expect law to encircle us in our earthly sphere and
to travel with us to the alien vastness of outer space. We
want courts to sustain personal liberty, to end our racial
tensions, to outlaw war, and to sweep contaminants from
the globe. We ask courts to shield us from public wrong
and private temptation, to penalize us for our transgressions
and to restrain those who would transgress against us, to
adjust our private differences, to resuscitate our moribund
businesses, to protect us prenatally, to marry us, to divorce
us, and, if not to bury us, at least to see to it that funeral
expenses are paid.'
* Justice, Utah Supreme Court.
1. Shirley Hufstedler, Charles Evans Hughes Address given to the New York County
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Much has been added to this list in ensuing decades, and no
one expects a reverse trend. The courts are constantly being
asked to answer questions without precedent in human
experience. Every appellate advocate thus undertakes the task of
teaching as well as persuading. There is, therefore, a literal sense
in which appellate advocates are "adult educators."
Notwithstanding this important dimension of their role,
however, I submit that few appellate lawyers have spent much
time thinking about its implications.
The scholarship in the field of adult education has
identified numerous important principles in the past few years,
but it is only very recently that those principles have begun to
permeate the legal profession. In 1990, the State Justice Institute
provided funding for the establishment of "The Leadership
Institute in Judicial Education" (now known as "The Leadership
Institute: Promoting Justice through Professional Education") to
bring experts in adult learning together with judges and judicial
educators to foster what is known as "education for
development" in the state judiciaries.2 More than forty states
have sent teams to the Institute since then, and the innovative
and creative quality of the educational opportunities available to
state judges reflects the widespread implementation of what we
know about how adults learn and change.
More recently, The American Law Institute-American Bar
Association (ALI-ABA) Committee on Continuing Professional
Education sponsored an Adult Learning Study, chaired by ABA
past-president Roberta Cooper Ramo. Two adult educators
(Professors Clifford Baden of the Harvard Graduate School of
Education and Lorraine Cavaliere of the Gwynedd-Mercy
College School of Graduate Education) served as reporters for
the Study, which issued a final report in April, 1999. In the first
chapter of the report, the Study lists the following core concepts
"to which virtually all adult educators subscribe":
Adults are most willing to invest time and energy in
learning something when they understand how it will be
Bar Association (1971).
2. See CHARLES S. CLAXTON & PATRICIA H. MURRELL, INFORMATION, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROJECT, EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES IN JUDICIAL EDUCATION (1992).
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useful to them. They prefer to learn those things that can
help them do what they want to do.
Adults bring a lifetime of experience to every learning
situation. This experience is a very rich resource for adults'
learning. Good adult education takes advantage of this
resource and creates opportunities for adults to reflect on
and build on their experience.
Adults prefer to be self-directing. They do not like being
talked down to or controlled. They do like participating
actively in the planning and implementation of a learning
activity. Therefore, an appropriate role for the teacher (or
"facilitator") is to engage in a process of mutual inquiry
with them, rather than simply transmit information to them
and expect them to accept and conform to it.
Adults are different from each other in many ways,
including how they learn best. Therefore, education of
adults should acknowledge and provide for these
differences.3
The foregoing core concepts support my suggestion that
appellate judges may appropriately be viewed as adult learners.
We certainly qualify as motivated; we need the technical
information and the policy context that our "teachers"-
appellate lawyers-bring to do our work. We do begin our
assessment of every case with a "lifetime of experience," which
is sometimes as much of an obstacle to learning as a benefit;
clearly such life experience is an important consideration for
advocates who may be asking us to change our ways of thinking.
We also prefer to be "self directing" and dislike being talked
down to. Finally, we all have preferred ways of "information
processing, idea formation, and decisionmaking," and they are
not all the same ways.4 The ALI-ABA Study Report discusses
learning style theory and its relationship to personality types,
with a view to understanding its implications for good adult
legal education.
3. ALI-ABA ADULT LEARNING STUDY COMM'N, TEACHING FOR BETTER LEARNING:
ADULT EDUCATION IN CLE (1999).
4. CLAXTON & MURRELL, supra note 2; David H. Kalsbeek, Linking Learning Style
Theory with Retention Research: The TRAILS Project, 32 ASS'N FOR INSTITUTIONAL
RESEARCH 1 (1989).
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One well-known body of work on learning style theory
illustrates what some of those implications might be.' Kolb's
Model of Experiential Learning suggests that adults learn best
not just by reading or listening, thinking, or doing something
new, but by a combination of all of these methods. Kolb's
theory posits the four-stage process of learning and problem-
solving as a dynamic cycle of (1) concrete experience; (2)
observation and reflection; (3) the formation of abstract concepts
and generalizations; and (4) the development of hypotheses to
be tested by further concrete experience.7 As the ALI-ABA
Report concludes:
Kolb's theories have several implications for [adult
educators], beyond the reminder that all adults develop
particular strengths or preferences in the way they learn:
As far as possible, [learning experiences] should be
structured to allow learners to experience multiple
modes of learning. Ideally, each program would
include opportunities for lawyers to experience a
situation, problem, or dilemma; to reflect on it; to
make some generalizations (based on their
observations and reflections); and to plan for how
they will incorporate these new insights in their
practice.
Such an approach would enable all lawyers to
demonstrate their learning strengths. No single
learning mode would receive all the attention.
This approach would also help each lawyer develop
the ability to function in the other three learning
modes. Since each of the four learning modes
develops different abilities, adopting this model could
make it possible for lawyers to master many more of
the wide variety of competencies they need in
practice.
5. See DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE OF
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1984).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. ALI-ABA REPORT, supra note 3; see also Cynthia Ann Kelley, Education for
Lawyer Competency: A Proposal for Curricular Reform, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 607, 621
(1983).
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The rather rigid design of our appellate advocacy system-
written briefs, time-limited oral argument (and sometimes no
oral argument at all)--creates arbitrary restrictions on the
teaching techniques available to the appellate advocate.
Attention to Kolb's learning cycle, however, can be paid even in
the most limited of contexts. The facts of a dispute, for example,
or graphic demonstration of them by charts, photographs or
other visual means, will often supply a surrogate "concrete
experience" for the appellate judge, enabling her to engage with
the case in an active way. "Observation and reflection" should
be invited by the analytical portions of every brief and by the
discussion designed for oral argument. I have often urged
appellate lawyers to focus their advocacy on WHAT they want
the court to do, WHY it should do it, and HOW it can within the
limits of applicable law, language, policy, and precedent. Since
encountering Kolb's model, I understand that my advice was in
fact anticipating at least the last two phases of the learning
cycle-the formulation of organizing theory and of hypotheses
(i.e., dispositions) that might work to resolve a present case and
apply to future ones.
The goal of such advocacy is quite straightforward: The
advocate/teacher wants the judge/learner to travel a problem-
solving path, or perhaps more accurately to work around the
learning cycle in a way that brings the learner to a point of
richer, more complex understanding of both the problem and the
best way out. I suppose there are cases where an advocate's goal
is to obscure and limit understanding; but I candidly confess that
when I don't understand a lawyer's point, I tend to assume that
it is the argument that has problems. Deliberate obfuscation is
always a high-risk undertaking.
One other characteristic of appellate judges as adult
learners is worth mentioning, having to do with the logistics of
our jobs. For the most part, we function in busy, frequently high-
volume courts. We read huge stacks of briefs and listen to many
hours of oral argument every month. To the extent that
advocates ignore these circumstances and inflict on us over-
long, poorly organized or badly written briefs, and unfocused or
unhelpful arguments, they minimize their chances of engaging
us with their material, teaching us what it is about, and
convincing us to do what they need done. Some lawyers, for
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example, resent or are intimidated by active questioning from
the bench at oral argument. Yet everything we know about adult
learners suggests that the passive listener may be the least likely
to be traveling around the learning cycle and thus the least likely
to be responding to the lawyers' arguments. Some judges really
do use oral argument to learn-particularly to test theories and
examine hypotheticals.
The relationship between teacher and student is long
recognized and honored by human society. Much might be
added to our sense of common endeavor, civility, and
collegiality in appellate practice if we were more often aware-
more mindful-of the values and uses of that relationship
between lawyer and judge.
